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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1957
In the Mitlward47 case the Supreme Court -held that an adopted child
could not -inherit from his natural parent, although the statute which curs
off -the common law right of inheritance was enacted after the adoption.
Illegitimacy
The Supreme Court reiterated its prior holding that an illegitimate
child cannot be a dependent under the workmen's compensation death
benefit statute, even though .the child ,is acknowledged as such by the
father and -is supported -by him.48
Whitecotton v. Whitecotton"4 raised the -problem of the legitimacy
of a child whose mother was married at his birth. The husband sued
for divorce, alleging .that there were no children of the marriage, which
allegation was denied by the wife. The trial court held that the evi-
dence failed -to establish either that the child was legitimate, or that he
was illegitimate, and -therefore made no order relative to the parentage,
custody or support of the child. This obvious error was firmly reversed
by the court of appeals. If the trial court is unable .to make up its mind
on the -issue of paternity, the presumption in favor of legitimacy comes
into play and decides .the case. Since the child is presumed legitimate,
and the trial court did not affirmatively find illegitimacy, .the court must
enter a custody and support order.
Prohably the most interesting case in this area is a decision of the
Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County on the conclusive effect of a blood
test in a paternity action. The court held -that the evidence of non-
paternity produced by the court-appointed serologist outweighed all the
other evidence and compelled a finding for the defendant. The court
comes very close to taking judicial notice of the correctness of such a
test, where -the person making .the test is both qualified and objective.50
HUGH ALAN Ross
EQUITY
In Weila d v. Indasrial Commission of Ohio,1 an attorney was noti-
fied that trial of the case would begin at 9:30 i m. on a specified day.
He left his home, some fifty miles distant, about two hours before that
"In re Estate of Millward, 166 Ohio St. 243, 141 N.E.2d 462 (1956).
'
3 Miller v. Ind. Com., 165 Ohio St. 584, 138 N.E.2d 672 (1956).
103 Ohio App. 149, 144 N.E.2d 678 (1955).
' State ex rel. Steiger v. Gray, 145 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1957). One of the
best recent articles on this subject is Ross, Valne of Blood Tests as Evidence in
Paternity Cases, 71 HARV. L Riry. 466 (1958).
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hour. En route he experienced automobile trouble and promptly in-
structed his office to inform the court of this fact and that he could not
reach 'the court 'until ten o'clock. His office complied. The court waited
until ten o'clock and then commenced trial. The attorney arrived about
10:10 a. m. After the case -had been submitted -to the jury, the judge
called the attorney to the bench and following a discussion as to the
cause of the tardiness found -the attorney in contempt and imposed a fine
of $100. The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion and an ap-
peal was taken to the Supreme Court. The latter court reversed and re-
manded on two grounds. First, the trial court had handled this as a
direct contempt whereas "only a portion of the offense was direct and in
the presence of the court, namely entering the court late and after the trial
had started. However, part of the alleged misconduct was committed on
the 'trip ...and hence was not in or near the court itself." Conse-
quently, tthis was in the nature of indirect contempt and the attorney
should have been informed of the nature of the contempt when sum-
moned before the judge. Also, he was entitled to proffer evidence to
show any extenuating or exculpatory circumstances. Second, -the Supreme
Court held, that, -if the guilt be assumed, the fine imposed was so dis-
proportionate as to require reversal.
As a part of an earlier divorce proceeding, a father had been ordered
to -pay a specified amount for the support of his children. He fell be-
hind in these payments and was adjudged in contempt. Subsequently,
he lost his job. In Stafford v. Stafford,2 he sought to have the amount
of -the payments reduced. The court held that while it was 'his duty to
purge himself of this violation if possible, the violation and contempt
adjudication did not -prevent him from requesting the reduction in the
payments under the doctrine of unclean hands.
In Hahn v. Hahn,3 as part of a divorce action, custody of children
had been awarded to the wife. The husband had been ordered -to pay
support money. He had been continuously in default in such payment
and for this had 'been found guilty of contempt. He filed a motion
that exclusive care of the children be granted to him. The 'trial court
dismissed the motion. The court of appeals held that such action was
proper, saying, "Flagrant disregard 'by the defendant [husband] of the
order of the court was the basis of the action taken dismissing his mo-
tion. We are of opinion that a court -is within its discretionary right in
denying the processes of the law to a party in a case who refuses to ob-
1166 Ohio St. 62, 139 N.E.2d 36 (1956).
2139 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
8 144 N.E.2d 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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serve the orders of the Court in that case."4 It should be noted in this
case that the husband had failed to respond to a -notice to show cause
why his motion should not be dismissed.
The legislative branch of the government may provide for the use of
-the injunctive process without satisfaction of the conventional condition
of lack of other adequate remedies. In Johnson v,. United Enterprises,
Inc.,5 an injunction was sought against an alleged violation of a zoning
ordinance. Defendant demurred on the claim that, under Ohio Revised
Code section 2505.03, the order of the Board of Zoning Appeals for
issuance of a permit for the construction could be appealed and that
since this provided for an adequate remedy no injunction was necessary.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, held that Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 713.13 which provides for use of the injunctive process where an
owner of contiguous property will be irreparably damaged by a violation
of the building code was a special statute and prevailed over the above
cited general statute. The court distinguishes Eggers v. Morr.
6
The doctrine of laches was the subject of the coures inquiry in Mc-
Grath v. Kneisley.7 Defendant, in violation of a restrictive covenant, had
constructed a house too near plaintiff's property line. Plaintiff's property
was a vacant lot and 'he visited it infrequently. When ,plaintiff discovered
the violation, construction was well advanced. He then promptly notified
defendant of the violation and filed suit for an injunction. The lower
court decided that the injunction would have been granted had it not been
for the delay in plaintiff's objection, but refused the injunction on the
basis of the doctrine of laches. The court of appeals held, however, that
plaintiff was under -no legal obligation to visit his lot and therefore could
not be charged with imputed knowledge of the violation. Consequently,
since objection was promptly made following actual discovery of the
violation, the doctrine of laches did not apply and the injunction should
have been granted.
In Keyerleber v. Euclid Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses,8 the
vendors were induced to sell certain vacant land adjacent to their home
on the inducement that the person to whom they were selling wished to
build a residence on it. Actually it was the plan and intent of the pur-
chaser to immediately deed it to a religious congregation in order that
they might build a church thereon. A deed was delivered to the pur-
chaser who then deeded to the congregation. Immediately thereafter the
'Id. at 501.
' 166 Ohio St. 149, 140 N.E.2d 407 (1957).
'162 Ohio St. 521, 124 N.E.2d 115 (1955).
7142 N.B.2d 530 (Ohio Ct App. 1956).
103 Ohio App. 423, 143 N.E.2d 313 (1957).
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